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FY 1995 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

READINESS JUSTIFICATION BOOK



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ELECTE
JUN 16 1994
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

MAY 1994

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INTRODUCTION

In a September 27, 1993 Senate Appropriations Report, the Senate directed "the Department to submit, along with the other justification materials accompanying the Department's 1995 O&M budget request and for each year thereafter, a readiness J-book. Information provided in this report should include, as a minimum, indicators for each military service which describe historical trends in, the current status of, and future prospects for: achieving manpower fill rates in critical force units; sustaining manpower skill levels and training activities; meeting accession goals and quality; satisfying reenlistment requirements; meeting manpower C-rating requirements; sustaining equipment fill rates; and achieving equipment mission capable rating goals."

SECTION I: MILITARY PERSONNEL

The foundation of the Department of the Navy's manpower strategy is that personnel reductions must keep pace with force structure drawdowns. This resultant smaller force structure can become unbalanced with a mismatch of properly needed skills for both officer and enlisted personnel; the people in these "overmanned" areas must then be targeted for conversion to other specialties or for early release. Similarly, as our paygrade pyramid shrinks, its shape must remain the same, i.e., junior paygrades must be downsized at the same rate as the senior paygrades.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps desire to protect force readiness in the near term by protecting quality people currently on board, maintain sufficient accession levels to preclude a "hollow force" in the future, manage officer accessions and retention to maintain the correct grade/quality mix, improve recruit quality to reduce attrition and ensure long term readiness, and rebalance the enlisted skill mix using existing force management tools.

The Department of the Navy, where applicable, is drawing down in a controlled, steady manner. Far from focusing solely on reducing end strength numbers, we are committed to replenishing and retaining a core of experienced and well-trained people who will effectively execute our mission now and in the future.

Military Personnel Inventories
Navy
Part I Total Manning

<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992				
Active	482.1	464.9	96.4	456.5
Reserve	151.8	138.6	91.3	137.2
FY 1993				
Active	454.8	436.7	94.6	430.2
Reserve	150.0	139.5	93.0	129.3
FY 1994				
Active	407.6	399.7	98.1	n/a
Reserve	136.0	112.1	82.4	n/a
FY 1995				
Active	387.4	375.0	96.8	n/a
Reserve	126.1	99.4	78.8	n/a

Data does not include Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMAs) or Individuals Account. The data for FY 1992 was estimated because of the DoD directed change from Defense Planning and Programming Category (DPPCs) to Defense Mission Codes (DMCs) and subsequent change to the Navy software support systems.

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

The Navy's programmed manning is oriented toward ensuring that personnel are available to meet the manpower requirements established by force structure. The end strength reflects the decreasing manpower requirements in response to the reduction in force structure.

Military Personnel Inventories
Marine Corps
Part I Total Manning

<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992				
Active Reserve	175.2 40.8	160.3 37.3	91.5 91.4	155.6 38.5
FY 1993				
Active Reserve	170.9 40.6	149.6 37.4	87.5 92.1	149.0 36.9
FY 1994				
Active Reserve	162.3 40.1	145.8 37.7	89.8 94.0	n/a n/a
FY 1995				
Active Reserve	162.0 42.3	145.2 37.4	89.6 88.4	n/a n/a

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

The percent manning of fleet Marine forces is tied to force structure. We continually strive to achieve 90 percent manning of our wartime structure, as prescribed by the Defense Planning Guidance.

Exhibit A, Part I

Military Personnel Inventories
NAVY
Part II Manning for Tactical Air Forces

	<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992					
Active	29.3	27.8	94.9	27.9	95.2
Reserve	10.0	5.5	55.0	5.4	54.0
FY 1993					
Active	27.6	26.8	97.1	27.3	98.9
Reserve	7.3	4.1	56.2	4.0	54.6
FY 1994					
Active	24.9	24.7	99.2	n/a	n/a
Reserve	10.8	4.1	38.0	n/a	n/a
FY 1995					
Active	21.9	21.7	99.1	n/a	n/a
Reserve	7.7	1.6	20.8	n/a	n/a

In FY 1993, aircraft carriers decrease to thirteen with the decommissioning of one Forrestal class carrier.
In FY 1994, aircraft carriers decrease to twelve with the decommissioning of one Forrestal class carrier.

Exhibit A, Part II

Military Personnel Inventories

Navy

Part III Manning for Ship Operating Forces

	<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992					
Active Reserve	295.4 93.1	286.5 83.8	97.0 90.0	276.5 83.8	93.6 90.0
FY 1993					
Active Reserve	281.0 96.2	278.2 80.8	99.0 84.0	269.0 82.5	95.7 85.8
FY 1994					
Active Reserve	254.4 78.5	252.6 68.7	99.3 87.5	n/a n/a	n/a n/a
FY 1995					
Active Reserve	244.3 74.6	239.4 63.5	98.0 85.1	n/a n/a	n/a n/a

For various classes of ships which were decommissioned, including surface combatants, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and submarines, appropriate manpower adjustments were made to accommodate the reduced number of ships.

Exhibit A, Part III

Military Personnel Inventories

Navy

Part IV Manning for Land Combat Forces

<u>Programmed Requirement</u>		<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992					
Active	5.6	5.6	100.0	5.1	91.1
Reserve	2.4	2.4	100.0	2.3	95.8
FY 1993					
Active	5.7	5.6	98.2	5.1	89.5
Reserve	2.4	2.4	100.0	2.1	87.5
FY 1994					
Active	5.8	5.7	98.3	n/a	n/a
Reserve	2.2	2.2	100.0	n/a	n/a
FY 1995					
Active	5.8	5.7	98.3	n/a	n/a
Reserve	2.2	2.2	100.0	n/a	n/a

Exhibit A, Part IV

Military Personnel Inventories
 Marine Corps
 Part V Fleet Marine Force Manning

<u>Programmed Requirement</u>	<u>Budgeted End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Manning</u>	<u>Actual End Strength</u>	<u>Percent Achieved</u>
FY 1992 Active	127.5	115.2	90.4	111.0
				87.1
FY 1993 Active	124.3	110.1	88.6	106.9
				86.0
FY 1994 Active	120.4	108.5	90.1	n/a
				n/a
FY 1995 Active	120.1	107.6	89.6	n/a
				n/a

Exhibit A, Part V

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade

		Navy		
		FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994
		Budgeted	End Strength	FY 1995
E1-E4	Actual	247,024 234,963	241,057 220,477	210,467 n/a
E5-E9				191,943 n/a
Budgeted	End Strength	230,358	222,840	203,358
Actual		233,415	218,956	n/a
Cadets				
Budgeted	End Strength	4,550	4,450	4,228
Actual		4,431	4,171	n/a
Warrant Officers				
Budgeted	End Strength	2,701	2,629	2,735
Actual		2,911	2,764	n/a
01-03				
Budgeted	End Strength	41,978	40,288	36,896
Actual		41,097	39,466	n/a
04-06				
Budgeted	End Strength	24,550	24,306	22,893
Actual		24,855	23,876	n/a
07-10				
Budgeted	End Strength	239	230	223
Actual		249	240	n/a
Total				
Budgeted	End Strength	551,400	535,800	480,800
Actual		541,921	509,950	n/a

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends
By grade fluctuations from FY 1992 to FY 1995 are driven by force structure requirements.

Exhibit B

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade					
	Navy Reserve				
	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1995
E1-E4					
Budgeted End Strength	52,662	50,034	41,034	33,090	
Actual	52,110	42,980	n/a	n/a	n/a
E5-E9					
Budgeted End Strength	61,754	56,833	49,501	46,542	
Actual	63,206	62,274	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cadets					
Budgeted End Strength	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Actual	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Warrant Officers					
Budgeted End Strength	508	552	460	435	
Actual	364	366	n/a	n/a	n/a
O1-O3					
Budgeted End Strength	13,276	12,254	10,362	9,326	
Actual	10,389	9,946	n/a	n/a	n/a
O4-O6					
Budgeted End Strength	13,877	13,926	11,976	11,253	
Actual	16,161	16,781	n/a	n/a	n/a
O7-O10					
Budgeted End Strength	77	76	67	64	
Actual	46	48	n/a	n/a	n/a
Total					
Budgeted End Strength	142,154	133,675	113,400	100,710	
Actual	142,276	132,395	n/a	n/a	n/a

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends
By grade fluctuations from FY 1992 to FY 1995 are driven by force structure requirements.

Exhibit B

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade
Marine Corps

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>
E1-E4				
Budgeted End Strength	114,873	111,431	107,214	106,518
Actual	112,720	108,799	n/a	n/a
E5-E9				
Budgeted End Strength	54,062	52,129	48,935	49,505
Actual	52,735	51,150	n/a	n/a
Warrant Officers				
Budgeted End Strength	1,854	1,870	1,907	1,871
Actual	1,832	1,885	n/a	n/a
01-03				
Budgeted End Strength	11,878	11,271	10,654	10,630
Actual	11,933	11,390	n/a	n/a
04-06				
Budgeted End Strength	5,266	5,134	5,222	5,413
Actual	5,303	5,087	n/a	n/a
07-10				
Budgeted End Strength	67	65	68	63
Actual	67	68	n/a	n/a
Total				
Budgeted	188,000	181,900	174,000	174,000
Actual	184,590	178,379	n/a	n/a

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

The Marine Corps reaches its base force target end strength of 174,000 in FY 1994. By grade fluctuations from FY 1993 to FY 1995 are driven by structure requirements.

Exhibit B

Budgeted and Actual Military Personnel End Strength by Grade
Marine Corps Reserve

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>
E1-E4				
Budgeted End Strength	29,639	29,520	29,092	28,955
Actual	29,436	28,773	n/a	n/a
E5-E9				
Budgeted End Strength	9,495	9,282	9,422	9,377
Actual	9,256	9,319	n/a	n/a
Warrant Officers				
Budgeted End Strength	462	519	510	507
Actual	518	504	n/a	n/a
01-03				
Budgeted End Strength	1,325	1,396	1,395	1,388
Actual	1,392	1,380	n/a	n/a
04-06				
Budgeted End Strength	1,469	1,588	1,771	1,763
Actual	1,583	1,752	n/a	n/a
07-10				
Budgeted End Strength	10	10	10	10
Actual	10	10	n/a	n/a
Total				
Budgeted End Strength	42,400	42,315	42,200	42,000
Actual	42,195	41,738	n/a	n/a

Section II: MILITARY PERSONNEL ACCESSIONS/REENLISTMENTS

The Department of the Navy's highest priority continues to be the accession and retention of people in the necessary quantity and quality to meet operational requirements. A key element in manning the smaller, more technical combat units of the future is the ability to successfully recruit to requirements for high school diploma graduate and upper mental group enlistees. The Department will need a quality future force because people are as integral to new weapon systems as hardware and must not only be recruited, but retained. Therefore, the Navy and Marine Corps continue to focus on retaining those enlisted and officer personnel whose mission critical skills contribute directly to readiness and whose talents are in shortest supply.

Quality of Active Duty Enlisted Accessions
Navy

	<u>FY 1992</u>		<u>FY 1993</u>		<u>FY 1994</u>	
	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Estimate</u>
Non Prior Service Accessions	56,764		62,344		56,085	
With High School Diploma	53,925	55,629	59,227	58,603	53,281	53,324
Without High School Diploma	<u>2,839</u>	<u>1,135</u>	<u>3,117</u>	<u>3,741</u>	<u>2,804</u>	<u>2,807</u>
Total	56,764		62,344		56,085	
Mental Category I-III	56,764	56,764	62,344	62,344	56,085	56,131
Mental Category IV	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	56,764		62,344		56,085	
Subtotal Non Prior Service Accessions	56,764		62,344		56,085	
Prior Service Accessions		<u>235</u>		<u>24</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>0</u>
Total Active Duty Accessions	56,999		62,368		56,103	

Synopsis of significant changes/trends:

Maintaining the quality of enlisted accessions remains an essential element in our plans for the Navy of the 21st century. The insistence for quality continues in response to demands of the technology present aboard our ships, submarines and aircraft. Recruiting quality has become increasingly difficult due to the reduced pool of 17-21 year old males and females* and the misperception of the public that the military no longer offers a viable career due to the drawdown.

*The size of the population reaches its nadir in FY 1994 and begins a steady growth projected to continue into the next century.

Exhibit C

Quality of Active Duty Enlisted Accessions
Marine Corps

	FY 1992		FY 1993		FY 1994		FY 1995	
	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Non Prior Service Accessions								
With High School Diploma	30,249	31,550	33,060	34,366	31,038	34,689		
Without High School Diploma	<u>1,592</u>	<u>293</u>	<u>1,740</u>	<u>408</u>	<u>1,634</u>	<u>1,826</u>		
Total	31,841	31,843	34,800	34,774	32,672	36,515		
Mental Category I-III	31,841	31,838	34,800	34,770	32,672	36,515		
Mental Category IV *	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>		
Total	31,841	31,843	34,800	34,774	32,672	36,515		
Subtotal Non Prior Service Accessions	31,841	31,843	34,800	34,774	32,672	36,515		
Prior Service Accessions **	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>		
Total Active Duty Accessions	31,841	31,853	34,800	34,776	32,673	36,545		

* Mental Category IV are not routinely authorized; must meet stringent waiver criteria.

** There is no regular prior service accession goal; each request must be staffed through HQMC for approval on a case by case basis.

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

The Marine Corps continues to plan for and access only the highest quality of recruits.

Exhibit C

Enlisted Accessions
Navy

		Prior Service <u>Goal</u>	Prior Service <u>Actual</u>	Non-Prior Service <u>Goal</u>	Non-Prior Service <u>Actual</u>	Total <u>Goal</u>	Total <u>Actual</u>
FY 1992							
Active		0	235	58,208	56,764	58,208	56,999
Reserve		8,519	9,962	3,508	2,925	12,027	12,887
FY 1993							
Active		0	24	63,073	62,344	63,073	62,368
Reserve		11,529	12,730	2,932	3,706	14,461	16,436
FY 1994							
Active		18	n/a	56,085	n/a	56,103	n/a
Reserve		10,832	n/a	3,510	n/a	14,342	n/a
FY 1995							
Active		0	n/a	56,131	n/a	56,131	n/a
Reserve		11,414	n/a	4,133	n/a	15,547	n/a

Synopsis of significant changes/trends:

Navy has reduced new accessions as a major step in our personnel strategy, but end strength targets cannot be met solely through this action. FY 1995 enlisted accessions have been reduced to a sustaining level of 56,085, the minimum number required to sustain Navy's battle groups and prevent mid-grade officer shortfalls in the fleet of the future.

Enlisted Accessions
Marine Corps

	Prior Service		Non-Prior Service		Total	
	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Actual</u>
FY 1992						
Active Reserve	0	10	31,841	31,843	31,841	31,853
	3,120	1,923	5,289	5,091	8,409	7,014
FY 1993						
Active Reserve	0	2	34,800	34,774	34,800	34,776
	3,900	3,479	6,156	5,940	10,056	9,419
FY 1994						
Active Reserve	1	n/a	32,672	n/a	32,673	n/a
	3,700	n/a	6,023	n/a	9,723	n/a
FY 1995						
Active Reserve	30	n/a	36,515	n/a	36,545	n/a
	3,850	n/a	6,400	n/a	10,250	n/a

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

In an increasingly difficult recruiting environment, the Marine Corps has been able to meet its recruiting goals.

Due to large anticipated losses, the FY 1995 recruiting mission will increase significantly in order to maintain a 174,000 force.

Exhibit D

Number of Enlisted Reenlistments
Navy

	<u>FY 1992</u>		<u>FY 1993</u>		<u>FY 1994</u>	
	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>
First Term	17,615	17,088	24,100	15,905	16,439	14,629
Career	<u>41,713</u>	<u>39,588</u>	<u>33,628</u>	<u>36,289</u>	<u>32,753</u>	<u>34,379</u>
Total	59,328	56,676	57,728	52,194	49,192	49,008
Enlisted First Term Attrition	29,101	29,340	25,267	30,954	29,336	26,001
Enlisted First Term Retention Rate	39.0%	38.9%	35.0%	34.8%	34.8%	34.8%

Synopsis of significant changes/trends:

The reduction in first term and career reenlistment rates since FY 1992 reflects the desired result of drawdown policies.

Number of Enlisted Reenlistments
Marine Corps

	FY 1992 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1992 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1993 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1993 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1994 <u>Budgeted</u>	FY 1995 <u>Budgeted</u>
Initial Term*	3,151	2,327	3,107	1,616	2,164	3,053
Career*	<u>12,038</u>	<u>12,513</u>	<u>11,936</u>	<u>10,304</u>	<u>9,152</u>	<u>11,894</u>
Total	15,189	14,840	15,043	11,920	11,316	14,947
Enlisted First Term Attrition *	21,007	22,701	22,181	21,475	18,832	19,771
Enlisted First Term Retention Rate	15.8%	16.8%	13.4%	13.0%	18.2%	18.0%

The Marine Corps sets reenlistment goals for first term Marines only. First Term reenlistments will fluctuate depending upon structure requirements by MOS. First Term Alignment Plan (FTAP) controls reenlistments.

- * EAS Attrition includes all individuals who come to their end of contract but do not reenlist.

Synopsis of Significant Changes/Trends

All reenlistment requests are forwarded to headquarters Marine Corps for approval.

First term reenlistments are controlled by the first term alignment plan (FTAP); matches skill and grade requirements with current and projected inventories to avoid over population and promotion stagnation.

SECTION III: OPERATING TEMPO

Ship operations underway time is budgeted and measured by Ship OPTEMPO. Ship OPTEMPO represents the average number of underway days for ships operating in the deployed (6TH Fleet, 7TH Fleet, and Middle East Force) operating areas and the non-deployed (2ND Fleet and 3RD Fleet) operating areas. Ship OPTEMPO budgeting objectives are set at a level which allows the deployed Fleet forces to meet national commitments and provides sufficient underway time to allow the non-deployed Fleet forces to train and serve as a surge force.

TACAIR/ASW provides funding for Navy and Marine Corps Tactical Air (TACAIR) and aviation Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces. Tactical Air squadrons conduct strike operations against a wide range of threats identified in the national strategy and provide long range and local protection against airborne and surface threats. Anti-Submarine Warfare squadrons locate, destroy and provide force protection against sub-surface threats, and conduct maritime surveillance operations. The TACAIR/ASW requirement for active flying hours is based on the number of crews assigned to a squadron. Each crew is funded at a specific level of primary mission readiness (PMR) to achieve the overall active Navy goal of 83% PMR with an additional 2% of PMR achieved through simulator usage. With each active crew flying the hours indicated in Exhibit G, which includes simulator contribution, Navy and Marine Corps will achieve 85% PMR.

Training Opportunity Indicators (Quantities)
Department of Navy

	<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Budget</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Budget</u>
Flying Hours/Crew/Month (Includes Simulators)				
Navy Tactial Air/ASM	26	25	26	25
Marine Tactical Air	23	23	24	24
USNR Tactical Air/ASW	11.7	12.4	12.2	12.1
MCR Tactical Air	7.8	9.1	9.0	9.7
 Navy Steaming Days/Quarter				
Deployed Fleets	53.5	50.5	54.9	50.5
Nondeployed Fleets	29.4	29.0	28.3	29.0
Reserve Fleets	18.0	18.0	18.0	18.0
 Marine Corps				
Battalion Field Training Days	4,992	6,681	5,197	5,626
				5,571
				5,551

Exhibit P

Strategic Surge Capability

The following table displays the amount of pre-positioned stocks afloat and material ashore that could be moved in a 30-day period.

<u>Prepositioned Material</u>		<u>FY 1992</u>	<u>FY 1993</u>	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u>
<u>Afloat</u>					
<u>Number of Ships</u>		13	13	13	13
Short Tons		154,371	154,371	154,371	154,371
<u>Ashore</u>					
<u>Number of Sites</u>		6	6	6	6
Short Tons		26,160	26,160	26,160	26,160

ALOAT - The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) gives the unified CINCs a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness. The MPF program involves 13 ships, organized into 3 squadrons. The MPF reduces the response time from weeks to days by prepositioning the bulk of equipment and 30 days of supplies for a 16,500-man Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) aboard specially designed, strategically deployed ships. The MEB's personnel and selected equipment can be airlifted quickly using approximately 250 strategic airlift sorties to an objective area to join with its equipment. Equipment and supplies can also be selectively off-loaded to support smaller Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). As demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Restore Hope, MPF was integral to the rapid deployment of credible forces to provide combat power and humanitarian assistance. Funding is provided to the operating forces for MPF exercises each year.

ASHORE - The land repositioning program, Norway Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB), is a DoD directed, NATO initiative which was established to provide NATO with a rapid reinforcement capability on its northern flank. The program was designed to significantly reduce strategic airlift requirements, force closure time, and provide wider strategic options for rapidly reinforcing the northern flank with a potent, sustainable force. Prepositioning equipment and supplies designed to support 13,200-man MEB are stored in six man-made caves in central Norway. The MEB flies into Norway using a minimum amount of strategic airlift, marries up with the equipment and supplies, and redeploys throughout Norway as needed.

Exhibit G

Force Structure

For the ship forces Percentage of Time Free (POTF) measures the amount of time during a fiscal year that ships did not report any critical mission degrading equipment Casualty Reports (CASREPS). Material CASREPS indicate degradations to equipment and systems which can not be repaired in a timely manner by ship's force due to a lack of onboard spares or the inability to effect repairs because of ongoing operations, ship repair capability, or lack of technical expertise. The Navy does not have established goals for POTF. The FY 1994 and FY 1995 projections of POTF are composite values for all surface ships.

For aviation forces, Fully Mission Capable (FMC) is the material condition of an aircraft that can perform all of its missions defined in the Mission Essential Subsystems Matrices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. Mission Capable (MC) is the material condition of an aircraft that can perform at least one and potentially all of its missions defined in the Mission Essential Subsystems Matrices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft. The calculation of FMC/MC is based on the number of aircraft in reportable status; that is the total inventory less those aircraft in Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM). The difference between FMC/MC rates reported by Navy and Marine Corps is a result of the aircraft mix that is operated by each service.

**Force Structure - Active
Mission Capable Rates**

		FY 1992 <u>Actual</u>	Goal <u>Actual</u>	FY 1993 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1994 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1995 <u>Actual</u>	FY 1995 <u>Goal</u>
Navy	Tactical/ASW Aircraft	56.0%	56.1%	56.0%	56.8%	56%	56%
	Fully Mission Capable (FMC)	73.0%	68.0%	73.0%	68.5%	73%	73%
	Mission Capable (MC)						
Marine Corps	Tactical Aircraft						
	Fully Mission Capable (FMC)	56.0%	62.4%	56.0%	66.3%	56%	56%
	Mission Capable (MC)	73.0%	71.4%	73.0%	77.0%	73%	73%
	Ship Battle Forces (POTF)						
	Aircraft Carriers	N/A	66.5%	N/A	60.8%	67%	63%
	Surface Combatants	N/A	70.3%	N/A	66.0%	67%	63%
	Amphibious	N/A	68.8%	N/A	71.5%	67%	63%
	Combat Logistics	N/A	67.5%	N/A	68.8%	67%	63%
	Mobile Logistics	N/A	86.8%	N/A	83.0%	67%	63%
	Fleet Support	N/A	76.0%	N/A	72.3%	67%	63%
Marine Corps							
	Fire Support (MC) *	85.0%	89.7%	85.0%	86.6%	87.0%	82.0%
	Combat Vehicles (MC) *	85.0%	83.8%	85.0%	83.3%	89.5%	88.3%

FIRE SUPPORT - Consists of M198 155mm Howitzer and the M101A1 105mm Towed Howitzer
 COMBAT VEHICLES - Consists of the M1A1 Tank, and the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) and Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) families.

FMC: Fully Mission Capable
 MC: Mission Capable

POTF: Percent Time Free of C3/C4 Casualty Reports

- * The Marine Corps does not report combat essential ground equipment as Fully Mission Capable (FMC), therefore Mission Capable (MC) is the more appropriate measure.

Exhibit H